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COCO RISING: CAN THE EMERGENCE OF NOVEL HYBRID 
SECURITIES PROTECT FROM FUTURE LIQUIDITY CRISES? 
 
Eric S. Halperin 
 
"Even the most carefully crafted regulations cannot ensure that liquidity 
crises will not happen again. But, if moral hazard is effectively mitigated, 
and if financial institutions and investors draw appropriate lessons from 
the recent experience about the need for strong liquidity risk 
management practices, the frequency and severity of future crises should 
be significantly reduced."
1
 
“A nickel ain't worth a dime anymore.”2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The financial crisis unearthed truths that regulators would have 
preferred remain behind the curtain. This is not a presumptuous 
statement; Federal Reserve Bank of New York President and Chief 
Executive Officer William C. Dudley remarked that “the Fed and other 
regulators, both here and abroad, did not sufficiently understand some of 
the critical vulnerabilities in the financial system.”3 These exigencies 
included misaligned incentives, institutional interconnectivity and the 
rise of shadow banking.
4
 Through the lens of hindsight, rules have been 
proposed to account for prior defects in the system, but to focus solely 
astern does not assuage the difficulties that lie ahead. 
With an eye towards the future, many have speculated on the 
efficacy of contingent convertible capital (CoCo). Outlined most 
basically, CoCo could bolster the amount of capital available to 
systemically important institutions by converting certain debt 
instruments into common equity under specified conditions. The 
convertibility of such instruments in times of duress eases the debt 
burden on banks (or other critical bodies) by creating equity when raising 
it by other means would be most difficult.  
Contingent convertible capital can take a variety of forms. 
Proposals include Call Option Enhanced Reverse Convertibles 
(COERCs), enhanced notes, reverse convertible debentures (RCDs) and 
a host of other derivations. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision has recognized the importance of this innovation and 
proposed that all non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments contain 
clauses requiring them to be written off in the form of common stock at 
                                                     
1 Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
Markets Conference, (May 13, 2008). 
2 YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK: “I REALLY DIDN’T SAY EVERYTHING I SAID!” 19 (1999). 
3 See William C. Dudley, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve, Address at the Columbia 
University World Leaders Forum (Dec. 7, 2009). 
4 Id. 
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the time of a trigger event.
5
 However, the American Bankers Association 
has cautioned that regulations that demand too much may unduly 
increase the cost of capital to banks and apply too broadly to tiered 
instruments.
6
 The best form of contingent convertible capital likely rests 
somewhere between these posed extremes. 
Part II of this article illustrates the functionality of CoCo at the 
basic level, providing a hypothetical to illustrate its approach. Part III 
discusses the various forms CoCo may take, contrasting them through 
pricing, triggering and other key variables. Part IV presents CoCo in 
action through two issuances that occurred this prior year. The article 
concludes by advocating the implementation of CoCo in the financial 
system, while cautioning that CoCo is but one weapon within the arsenal 
needed to fortify the creation and use of capital throughout the global 
economy. 
 
II. THE FUNCTIONALITY OF CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE CAPITAL 
 
In late 2002, Professor of Finance Mark J. Flannery prophesied that  
[i]t is therefore puzzling that firms do not make advance 
arrangements to re-capitalize themselves if large losses occur. 
Financial distress may be particularly important for large banking 
firms, which national supervisors are reluctant to let fail. The 
supervisors’ inclination to support large financial firms when they 
become troubled mitigates the ex ante incentives of market 
investors to discipline these firms.
7
  
 
This view was affirmed by the actions of the government in late 
2008, as firms deemed Too Big to Fail (TBTF) were protected, landing a 
blow to advocates of market discipline. More recently, Flannery assessed 
the market and concluded that an alternative channel is needed to induce 
TBTF firms to prepare for adverse investment outcomes.
8
 The rapid 
movements of a market in both times of health and strain decrease the 
ability of regulators to exert their influence.
9
  
                                                     
5 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document: Proposal to ensure 
the loss absorbency of regulatory capital at the point of non-viability, issued Aug. 2010. 
6 See Mary Frances Monroe, American Bankers Association, Re: Consultative Document: 
Proposal to ensure the loss absorbency of regulatory capital at the point of non-viability, Oct. 1, 
2010. Letter from Mary Frances Monroe, Vice President, Office of Regulatory Policy, American 
Bankers Association to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International 
Settlements (Oct. 1, 2010). 
7 Mark J. Flannery, No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via “Reverse Convertible 
Debentures”, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING SECURITIES AND INSURANCE 171 
(Hal S. Scott ed., 2005) (emphasis added). 
8 Mark J. Flannery, Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with Contingent Capital 
Certificates 1 (University of Florida, Working Paper No. 4, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1485689 (due to regulatory reliance on book 
accounting values, their knowledge lags the market in times of financial difficulty). 
9 Id. at 2. 
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Firms have fallen short in their ability to remedy self-created 
predicaments. When injections of capital are most crucial, lenders tighten 
the purse strings, leaving key institutions unable to meet their obligations 
and creating contagion that can cripple the economy. Lenders will be 
wary of assuming new credit as overhang de-emphasizes new 
debtholders in favor of shareholders who will use increased leverage to 
strengthen their position. Outside equity holders will likewise refrain 
from purchasing equity stakes as their funds will be used to meet the 
debtholders’ outstanding obligations. Any fair value that new equity 
entrants receive will come out of the pockets of the initial shareholders.
10
 
Valuation further exacerbates difficulties as the asymmetric flow of 
information limits market knowledge. 
It has become a surety that capital requirements will be raised in 
response to the catastrophe. Yet this response imposes costs to the 
viability of institutions that are reluctant to tie up their reserves in Tier 1 
equity. CoCo instruments afford flexibility that can aid banks and their 
investors. The securities have the same upside as regular debt. As long as 
companies operate with vigor and within prescribed capital ratios, the 
bonds pay contractual coupon rates to their holders. However, should 
unwelcome circumstances arise, the bonds convert to equity, with the 
accompanying potential of a total loss in value if a firm is beyond 
rescue.
11
 
Flannery proposes the introduction of contingent capital certificates 
(CCC) to fill the buffer between debt and equity.
12
 An ideal system may 
have TBTF firms maintaining high ratios of equity to their risky assets, 
but such an arrangement loses the Federal Tax Code’s advantages 
offered to debt. CCC originates as debt and should receive the same tax 
advantages in its unconverted state.
13
 As long as the CCC remains 
unconverted, it will continuously provide those tax advantages, making 
its carrying cost low to the issuing firm.
14
 However, once a firm 
experiences losses, this will upset certain ratios stated in the covenants of 
the certificate, triggering an automatic conversion into equity. Upon 
conversion, the ratios can be restored to safe levels without needing to 
resort to the outside market. The company can remain viable and 
eventually replenish its supply of CCC to stem any future incursions 
below the trigger line. 
To demonstrate CCCs in action, imagine a market that requires a 
capital ratio of 4%. Firm A possesses a 5% capital ratio and its CCC 
covenants demand that Firm A maintain this ratio following any negative 
movement in the firm’s value. Its stock is currently priced at $5, and ten 
shares are outstanding. The balance sheet also maintains $900 in deposits 
                                                     
10 Id. at 14. 
11 See Monroe, supra note 6, at 2. 
12 Flannery, supra note 8, at 3. 
13 Currently there is no rule covering these contingent securities. If regulators are to favor the 
introduction of contingent capital, it would be nonsensical not to offer it favored tax treatment. 
14 See Flannery, supra note 8, at 5. 
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and $50 in CCC, yielding $1000 in total assets. Due to losses or market 
downfall, the value of the assets decreases by $30. This loss is assumed 
by the equity, which is reduced to $20, leaving a capital ratio of 2.06%. 
This triggers the CCC conversion due to the covenant requiring the 
capital ratio be maintained at the level of 5%. Thus, $28.50 of CCC will 
convert into equity, leaving $48.50 in equity, a 5% capital ratio and 
$21.50 of CCC remaining in store. The firm has been returned to safe 
operating levels.
15
 
After this conversion, the firm’s ownership structure has been 
adjusted. When the assets took their initial hit, equity decreased in value 
from $5 to $2 a share (the $30 loss divided by ten shares). In return for 
the use of their CCC, the prior debt holders now receive shares 
commensurate with the market value at the time of conversion. Thus, the 
$28.50 conversion warrants 14.25 shares of stock, which represents 
nearly 60% of the ownership stake. The former debtholders may now 
maintain this stake (if so authorized by regulation) or sell their shares on 
the open market.
16
 
Having illustrated its basic operation, the effect of contingent capital 
is readily evident. TBTF firms attain the ability to recapitalize via their 
internal financial structure. This ability averts the likelihood of failure 
and, with diligent assessment of the capital ratios, conversion can be 
seamlessly achieved (potential manipulations of the stock price will be 
addressed infra). Existing shareholders bear the brunt of the loss, as their 
stake is diluted by the new equity holders. This outcome is a preferable 
alternative to government assumption of shares or a complete loss of 
share value through liquidation, as these shareholders have failed to 
properly monitor their investment and allowed the firm’s capital ratio to 
deteriorate. The existing shareholders maintain a stake in the company 
and can then reassess management structures and business strategies. 
Unlike unsecured debtholders in reorganization, any loss to CCC holders 
will be minimal and anticipatable. The use of CCCs avoids the drudgery 
of reorganization, and the certificate holders are able to recoup their 
value either through their equity stake or by selling the shares on the 
open market. Senior debtholders are undisturbed. 
Flannery summarizes his proposal thusly: large financial firms need 
to maintain sufficient equity to render the possibility of default unlikely. 
The equity can satisfy one of two standards: “[c]ommon equity with a 
market value exceeding 6% of some asset or risk aggregate” or 
“[c]ommon equity with a market value exceeding 4% of total assets, 
provided [the firm] also has CCC debt that converts into shares if the 
firm’s equity market falls below 4% of total assets and the CCCs 
represent at least 4% of assets.”17 The CCC would convert the day after 
market shares fall below the 4% level, and enough CCC will convert to 
                                                     
15 This example has been drawn from Flannery, supra note 8, at 5-6. 
16 Flannery, supra note 8, at 5-6. 
17 Flannery, supra note 8, at 9. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW                  VOLUME 8 
19 
 
leave the common equity market value as 5% of the on-book assets. The 
converted debt’s face value purchases common shares based on the 
market price at conversion and the store of CCC should be replenished in 
time.
18
   
 
 
III.     PROPOSALS FOR STRUCTURING COCO INSTRUMENTS 
 
The above criteria provide the general sketch of CoCo’s potential 
use. The market can tailor the security to meet the needs of any 
individual firms or regional markets. This section outlines a variety of 
proposals, highlighting their individual strengths and weaknesses. The 
selected proposals are all notable for having garnered discussion in the 
field, but do not account for the myriad possible permutations, as feasible 
CoCo variations are virtually endless. 
 
A. Determining the Conversion Trigger 
 
1) The Market Value Trigger 
 
In conjunction with the above outline setting the pricing condition at 
time of sale, Flannery urges a market value conversion trigger. The direct 
benefit of this trigger is that it should reflect changes as they occur, 
which measures such as GAAP standards omit due to the delay in 
processing information. Flannery fears that a trigger based on a GAAP 
equity value, rather than the market value, would permit manager 
manipulation, and would ultimately delay the conversion, perhaps to a 
point where the firm’s true value would leave it insolvent. 
Flannery emphasizes that a market value trigger concerns only the 
individual firm, rather than the market at large. Other schemes 
(addressed infra) would wait until regulators declare a systemic crisis or 
for financial firms’ indices to fall in addition to the individual firm’s 
price. Waiting for secondary signals from the market at large may in fact 
allow certain firms to fail. Such a result is incongruent with the goal of 
CoCo, which is to stave off insolvency without requiring outside bailouts 
from the government.  
 
2) The Micro-level and Subjective Macro-level Dual Trigger 
 
A proposal put forth by the Squam Lake Group (alternatively, the 
“Group”)19 states that conversion of CoCo should occur only upon the 
occurrence of two conditions: a declaration by regulators that the 
financial system is undergoing a systemic crisis and a bank’s violation of 
                                                     
18 Flannery, supra note 8, at 10. 
19 This group is a “non-partisan, non-affiliated group of 15 academics who have come together 
to offer guidance on the reform of financial regulation.” See The Squam Lake Group, 
http://www.squamlakegroup.org/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2010). 
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covenants in the hybrid-security contract.
20
 The Squam Lake Group 
justifies the double trigger based on the disciplining force that debt has 
on management. From the Group’s perspective, allowing debt to 
transform to equity whenever there are losses undermines the 
disciplinary nature of debt by moving the obligation to meet coupon 
payments off the ledger. A corollary to this harsher treatment is that in 
dire times, but before a crisis is declared, no recapitalization will occur 
and banks may be left to fail. The Group proposes setting the bank-
specific trigger as the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-adjusted assets.  
The secondary trigger, declaration of systemic crisis, should not, by 
any means, be justification in itself to recapitalize. So long as firms are 
operating at levels above the covenanted trigger, there is no need to jump 
the gun on conversion. The Squam Lake Group argues that an objective 
trigger is a poor substitute for regulatory discretion due to the imprecise 
nature of the time-lagged data used by firms (note that this presumes 
some book-based, rather than external market value, reliance).
21
  
Flannery critiques this methodology as inherently contradictory. 
Waiting for the declaration of systemic crisis substantiates that a firm is 
in fact systemically important. Allowing such a firm to fail may itself 
create contagion and counter the very premise of CoCo proposals.
22
 As a 
declaration of systemic crisis is likely to encourage runs and sell-offs, 
those with the responsibility of proclaiming such an  urgent state of 
affairs face incentives to delay a declaration in hopes of avoiding the 
negative consequences. Such a delay jeopardizes the remaining 
deteriorating TBTF institutions that are left to suffer while awaiting 
clearance to enact their ready-made contingency plan. This inaction may 
serve as the death knell for the struggling entities rather than the life raft 
meant to keep them afloat when the market ceases to offer aid. 
 
3) The Dual Market Trigger 
 
Robert McDonald also promulgates a dual trigger conversion using 
the individual firm’s stock price and the value of a financial institution’s 
index.
23
 Despite its dual quality, McDonald’s approach is much more 
harmonized with the market reliance of Flannery’s CCC than the dual 
trigger of the Squam Lake Group. McDonald imagines a bank with a 
$100 stock price and a financial firm index also valued at $100. The bank 
issues 5-year, $1000 par bonds with a 6.25% interest rate. The trigger 
occurs when the stock price of the bank plummets below $50 and the 
financial index falls below $90. 
                                                     
20 See Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, An Expedited Resolution 
Mechanism for Distressed Financial Firms: Regulatory Hybrid Securities 4 (April 2009) (working 
paper), available at http://www.squamlakegroup.org. 
21 Id. 
22 Flannery, supra note 9, at 12. 
23 Robert L. McDonald, Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger (Feb. 15, 2010) 
(working paper), available athttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1553430. 
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The gains from such a trigger include setting conversion in motion 
only upon widespread decreases in firm value across the sector. This 
allows an institution to fail if the broader industry continues to perform 
well. It eliminates the need for regulatory involvement, with its 
accompanying subjective determinations and political pressures, and 
avoids reliance on accounting rules and stated assets. 
Yet it is unclear if a gain is truly achieved by letting a TBTF bank 
fail. McDonald poses the quandary of a financial index that will fall 
below the trigger only if an institution is left to fail, while the firm itself 
can only fail if CoCo is not triggered.
24
 He acknowledges that in such a 
scenario, the index would never descend below the trigger because the 
market would know that such a falling would trigger the conversion, 
saving the firm. This scenario presents the odd circumstance of a firm 
teetering on the edge of rescue, but nonetheless failing because the 
rescue would commence only upon a trigger that would never be pulled, 
as the market’s faith in the rescue prevents the index from dropping 
below the predetermined value. This clash begets the question of why a 
TBTF institution should ever be prevented from undergoing a CoCo 
conversion when conversion can mitigate danger to the financial system 
and spare the overwhelming burden of a reorganization or liquidation. 
 
B. Pricing the Conversion 
 
No matter the triggering condition, at some level each set of CoCo 
securities may convert to equity upon a given set of circumstances. The 
determinants behind the pricing upon conversion present the clearest 
opportunities for manipulation at the hands of speculators and possessors 
of CoCo bonds. This does not, however, suggest that regulation should 
set the conversion price level; if treated properly, the market should be 
able to attain workable pricing schemes that enthuse investment. This 
section outlines a variety of such methodologies, highlighting the 
advantages and disadvantages inherent in each. 
 
1) Market Value Pricing 
 
The conversion based upon present market value was presented 
above.
25
 At the time of conversion, the face value of the debt converts 
into an equivalent share value, priced at the current market value. If the 
market trades the firm at $5 and the CCC of the firm is $50, the CCC 
holders receive ten shares. The most direct benefit to this scheme is that 
it compensates CCC holders at very safe levels; they will not find their 
certificates shriveled by the firm’s troubles. This may allow for coupon 
rates at low values, indicative of the safety of the instruments. 
                                                     
24 Id. at 6, n. 9. 
25 See supra note 15. 
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The most immediate effect of this market value pricing will be 
dilution of current shareholder value. The influx of additional shares 
issued by the firm lowers the overall price per share. Some theorize that 
the downward value movement could lead to a death spiral. Speculators 
may buy CCC, short the stock, and then receive under-valued shares 
upon conversion.
26
 One study evaluating convertible debt and preferred 
stock issued by firms between 1994 and 1998 found many failed firms 
would have done so with or without the death spiral; their precarious 
solvency received temporary gains from converted securities but 
nonetheless failed.
27
 However, the failing firms tended to be younger, 
smaller firms. Comparatively, this discussion focuses upon TBTF firms 
with massive capital structures and much less susceptibility to 
manipulation.
28
 
Nonetheless, Flannery proposed three adjustments to the structure 
that can offset any potential short-selling gains. The first demands that 
the trigger be based on five to ten consecutive days of share prices, rather 
than one descent below the covenanted value.
29
 The second adjustment 
selects the CCCs that will convert by lottery to prevent short-sellers from 
knowing that their security would be selected. The third changes the law, 
banning interested CCC holders from short-selling the underlying 
stock.
30
 The latter solution begets the most difficulty and would require 
regulatory refinement before implementation, while the first two 
solutions offer more feasible options for this conversion value technique. 
 
2) Fixed Share Pricing 
 
The Squam Lake Group views Flannery’s pricing scheme warily, 
noting the opportunities for manipulation through shorting the stock. 
Using a wider range of daily stock prices to set the trigger invites 
management to purposefully spark the covenants during a systemic crisis 
to force conversion at a sale price that is not amenable to stockholders.
31
 
In response, the Group proposes pricing the conversion at a preordained 
quantity of equity shares.
32
 This would fix the number of shares received 
at the time of the certificate’s issuance, avoid death spirals and dampen 
management motivations to purposefully trigger conversion, unless the 
stock price greatly cedes ground to the bond payments. In such times, the 
company would likely be in need of recapitalization due to its poor 
                                                     
26 Flannery, supra note 8, at 18. 
27 See Pierre Hillion and Theo Vermaelen, Death Spiral Convertibles,7 J. FIN. ECON. 381-415 
(2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=273488. 
28 Flannery, supra note 8, at 19. 
29 This can also help prevent against Flash Crashes like that of May 6, 2010. See generally 
Tom Lauricella and Scott Patterson, Legacy of the ‘Flash Crash’: Enduring Worries of Repeat, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2010, at A1. 
30 See Flannery, supra note 8, at 20. 
31 See Squam Lake Group, supra note 20, at 5. 
32 Squam Lake Group, supra note 20, at 5. 
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performance, so the intentional triggering may serve to help 
stockholders.
33
 
McDonald also presents a fixed-share quantity conversion to 
accompany his dual price trigger.
34
 Because of the delay in time between 
the trigger and subsequent conversion, he finds it likely that the price per 
share at conversion will decrease below the trigger value. Returning to 
his prior example, the stock price may fall below $50, but continue to 
decline to a value around $48. If CoCo holders were entitled to twenty 
shares no matter the market price at conversion, they would suffer 
decreased value compared to their bond at par. They too would demand 
higher interest rates to recompense this loss.
35
  
A fixed-share quantity conversion should be less susceptible to 
profitable manipulation than a fixed-dollar conversion. McDonald and 
the Squam Lake Group seek to limit the potential for such rent-seeking 
through the fixed-share quantity conversion. With a fixed-dollar schema, 
similar to Flannery’s, CoCo holders can gain by artificially manipulating 
share prices low enough to trigger conversion while reaping the 
subsequent gains as the stock returns to its true value. The lower the 
share price is manipulated, the greater the gain will be. To further limit 
the potential for manipulation, McDonald proposes employing a 
conversion premium. Instead of the initial covenant allotting twenty 
shares for the $1000 par bond with a trigger at $50, the bond can convert 
to nineteen shares with the same trigger value. If a bondholder attempted 
to force conversion by bringing the price from $51 to $49, they would 
recoup only $931 from their initial $1000 par. Manipulation would not 
be profitable unless the share price were significantly above the trigger 
value, in this case $2.63 a share,
36
 requiring the value to be at least 
$52.63 to make manipulation profitable. Inspiring such a downward 
trend could be tremendously costly to market manipulators, and 
markedly so if their security remained subject to lottery before 
conversion.
37
 
The fixed-share quantity conversion mechanism may provide a 
disincentive to potential buyers of convertible debt. Instead of receiving 
a conversion amount equivalent to the value of their holdings, they may 
be forced to convert into a fixed quantity of shares. This fixed amount 
may come at a time of rapid diminution in share value, presenting a 
much greater burden to the CoCo holders who will suffer their allotment 
of the firm’s losses. Higher coupon rates would be necessary to 
compensate for the additional risk. CoCo investors, averse to receiving 
value below their regular payments, would have the added positive 
incentive to enhance monitoring of the firm’s performance, due to the 
allocation of loss now portioned between shareholders and debtholders. 
                                                     
33 Squam Lake Group, supra note 20, at 5. 
34 See McDonald, supra note 23, at 4. 
35 McDonald, supra note 23, at 5. 
36 ($1000-$950)/19 shares. 
37 See McDonald, supra note 23, at 11. 
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Management’s feet would be held closer to the fire by increased discount 
rates. However, whether a market for such a security can emerge is still 
uncertain, and the peril of investors losing interest in CoCo makes a 
fixed share quantity conversion too risky to currently advocate. 
 
3) Option Pricing  
 
The potential for market manipulation has inspired an alternative 
form of CoCo securities, Call Option Enhanced Reverse Convertibles.
38
 
A COERC has two distinguishing features: it sets the conversion price 
significantly below the trigger price and allows shareholders an option to 
buy the shares back from CoCo holders following the conversion. These 
features combine to incentivize shareholders to exercise the call option 
and repay the securities at par value.
39
 
A hypothetical COERC possesses a trigger price of $5 and a 
conversion price of $1. The highly leveraged firm at issue has assets of 
$1100, consisting of $1000 in secured debt, $30 in CoCo and $70 in 
equity. The equity is divided into seven shares, yielding a stock price of 
$10. Should the stock be manipulated to the $5 level, bondholders would 
convert their $30 of CoCo into thirty shares of $1 stock. This presents an 
overall equity structure of thirty-seven shares, with a non-manipulated 
value of $2.70.
40
 The existing shareholders would immediately seek to 
exercise their call option, buying back these new shares at the $1 price. 
Should they neglect to exercise their option, their equity value falls from 
$70
41
 to $18.92,
42
 a loss of $51.08. Instead, by buying back the shares at 
$1, they reap a gain of $51.
43
 The shareholders prevent dilution and the 
CoCo holders retain par value on their investment. 
Juxtapose the above manipulation price to a scenario of financial 
distress causing the true value of the stock to drop to $5. At this point the 
CoCo again converts into thirty shares priced at $1, but now the value of 
the overall equity is just $1.76 a share.
44
 Again, the shareholders would 
exercise their call option to buy back the shares, obtaining a gain of 
$22.80.  
In every scenario that values the diluted stock price over $1, the 
shareholders will exercise the call option. The CoCo holders will be 
repaid in full. This would not occur if the price was set at the trigger 
                                                     
38 See George Pennacchi, Theo Vermaelen & Christian C.P. Wolff, Contingent Capital: The 
Case for COERCs 3 (INSEAD, Working Paper 2010/89/FIN, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1711021. 
39 Id. at 9. 
40 Id. at 10-–11. This demonstration assumes the manipulation drove the stock to a level below 
its true value. To get $2.70, the $70 of equity and $30 of converted CoCo are divided by the number 
of shares. 
41 $7 x 10. 
42 $7 x 2.70. 
43 The $81 (30 x 2.70) true value minus the $30 (30 x 1) exercise price. 
44 Id. This consists of the thirty new shares, the $30 value of the new shares, and the $35 value 
of the old shares, divisible by the total number of shares. 
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value; in such a situation, the shareholders would only exercise the call 
when the fully diluted stock price exceeds the trigger, an unlikely 
scenario unless speculators are able to impact the price through 
manipulation.
45
 
The COERC option mitigates both the risk to CoCo holders inherent 
in a fixed quantity conversion and the associated incentives to monitor 
management. It also prevents the dilution of ownership that Flannery 
discussed. Yet, by not allowing for a revised ownership structure, 
familiar stakeholders maintain their position in a company experiencing 
difficulty (a fact gleaned from triggering). The COERC proposal notes 
that to set conversion at low stock prices, significant increases in 
authorized shares will be necessary.
46
 Upon conversion, the company 
will essentially have two options: deliver the shares or repay the debt 
(through the shareholder’s call option). There are added difficulties to 
either option, as many countries limit the percentage of shares that can be 
repurchased or impose taxes upon buy-backs. If regulators created 
loopholes for these contingent convertibles, such difficulties could be 
avoided. 
 
IV.    COCO IN ACTION 
 
While there is limited empirical evidence to document the potential 
of contingent convertible capital in TBTF firms, multiple studies have 
assessed the proper trigger points and benefits to a firm’s capital 
structures. Two major issuances in recent years explored the demand for, 
and structure of, contingent convertible capital instruments. This section 
surveys these studies before setting out the features of the first splash of 
contingent convertible capital. 
 
A. Viability of Using CoCo 
 
The viability of CoCo’s addition to a corporation’s capital structure 
must be examined before any mass movement towards its incorporation. 
A 2010 study endeavored to fulfill this mandate and ultimately 
determined that CoCo allows firms to recapitalize automatically and 
dependably in times of distress.
47
 The study set a single trigger at a 
market measure of solvency, kept the conversion terms as a contract 
parameter to be chosen, and operated on the assumption that interest 
payments on CoCo would be tax deductible in its unconverted state.
48
  
                                                     
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 13. 
47 See Boris Abdul, Dwight M. Jaffee, and Alexei Tchistyi, Contingent Convertible Bonds and 
Capital Structure Decisions 47, Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2010 
Financial Markets Conference, "Up from the Ashes: The Financial System after the Crisis," Atlanta, 
May 11–12, 2010. 
48 Id. at 3. 
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The study found firms will always gain from keeping CoCo in the 
capital structure due to its tax advantages. As a corollary to this 
determination, it is presumed CoCo substitutes for straight debt and not 
equity, to gain from the regulatory safety. Equity holders are likely to 
disfavor the swap of CoCo for debt, as the gain will primarily accrue to 
owners of the existing debt rather than shareholders.
49
 Bondholders at 
TBTF institutions may rightly believe their bonds are risk-free, as 
insolvency would be neglected in favor of bailouts. Introducing CoCo to 
the capital structure reduces this government subsidy by minimizing the 
cost of bailouts, a benefit to taxpayers.  
Confirming prognosticators’ suspicions, the study found CoCo 
creates an incentive for market manipulation. However, this 
manipulation is only fruitful if the ratio of equity conversion value to 
CoCo value is sufficiently high to make the exchange profitable. 
Conversely, existing equity holders have inverse manipulation goals and 
will seek to trigger the covenants only if the ratio of equity conversion 
value to CoCo value is low enough to enable the shareholders to profit. 
To maximize regulatory benefits, CoCo must substitute for straight 
debt in the capital structure. The absence of this allowance would see any 
gains lost, as the burden of debt would remain the same. The higher the 
conversion trigger threshold, the greater the subsequent gains; this will 
move firms into more solvent positioning early enough to potentially 
beat back systemic distress. But to achieve these results, there must be 
sufficient incentives for firms that will face resistance from equity 
holders who may ultimately be diluted while losing the gains from their 
expected government bailout subsidy. Finally, the benefits may be 
heightened if CoCo bonds could convert in a sequence of triggers and 
ultimately be replaced in the capital structure. Both of these assumptions 
are in line with Flannery’s initial theorem. 
A second study led by Giuseppe De Martino also sought to 
understand whether CoCo can provide a measurable benefit.
50
 The study 
focused on the top fifteen banks in total assets within eight countries
51
 
from 1994 to 2009. The sets of triggers used as the variables included the 
micro-level Tier 1 ratio, total capital ratio, leverage ratio, abnormal 
returns, return on equity, the macro-level banking index returns over 
different terms and the normalized real interbank rate. Controlling for 
years where triggers may be set-off doubly,
52
 the study found the double 
trigger based on total capital ratios would be hit too often to be effective, 
especially in European countries.
53
 Thus, the Tier 1 ratio acted as the 
more reliable indicator, with a 5% threshold serving the purpose of the 
                                                     
49 Abdul et al. acknowledge that this is the classic debt overhang problem. 
50 See Giuseppe De Martino, Massimo Libertucci, Mario Marangoni and Mario Quagliariello, 
Countercyclical Contingent Capital (CCC): Possible Use and Ideal Design, Bank of Italy 
Occasional Paper No. 71, Sept. 30, 2010. 
51 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
52 This would be unlikely due to the initial recapitalization upon triggering. 
53 De Martino et al., supra note 50, at 18. 
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instrument. For United States, United Kingdom and Canadian banks, the 
study determined that, due to historically high capital ratios, different 
eligibility standards would be required, such as market-based triggers. 
Ultimately, the assessment established that market-based triggers worked 
more accurately than prudential indicators. 
As discussed, the benefits of market-based triggers diminish when 
accounting for the tradeoff between greater volatility and risks of 
manipulation.
54
 Ultimately,it is likely that individual countries can best 
specify ideal triggers and conversion mechanisms for their particular 
needs. This avoids accounting for diverse regulatory regimes and non-
correlated market soundness.  
 
B. Lloyds Banking Group and Rabobank Case Studies 
 
In November 2009 the Lloyds Banking Group sought to exit the 
United Kingdom Government Asset Protection Scheme (GAPS) by 
exchanging existing securities for instruments labeled Enhanced Capital 
Notes (ECNs). In all, the proposal encompassed a £13.5 billion rights 
issue, with a £7.5 billion exchange offer.
55
 The insurance provided by the 
instrument was conversion into core Tier 1 capital in times of severe 
stress. The instrument raised the Core Tier 1 ratio to 8.6% and offered a 
leading market position by converting to equity if the published Core 
Tier 1 ratio falls below 5%.
56
 The ECNs would be exchanged on a par for 
par basis with an enhanced coupon rate. The new ECNs were treated as 
Tier 2 at issue, and the conversion price was set at the higher of a five 
day value weighted average price or 90% of the closing price as of 
November 17, 2009. However, the instrument was given Tier 1 quality 
for stress test capital calculations. 
As many of Lloyds existing securities were subject to deferred or 
suspended coupon payments, the issuance was unsurprisingly successful. 
The coupon rate was set at a figure between 1.5% and 2.5% higher than 
the exchanged note. The design of the exchange eased exit from 
participation in GAPS, and investor interest was overwhelming enough 
to require expansion of the offering. 
Rabobank issued its own Senior Contingent Note (SCN) in March 
2010, priced at a premium over subordinated debt, with the issuance 
valued at a higher-than-expected €1.25 billion to meet demand.57 Both 
Rabobank’s and Lloyds’ instruments maintained ten year coupons and 
premium pricing. However, the structure of conversion was altogether 
different. Until conversion, Rabobank’s notes were treated as senior 
                                                     
54 De Martino et al., supra note 50, at 24. 
55 See Lloyds Banking Group, Rights Issue and Capital Enhancement Proposals, Nov. 3, 2010. 
56 This raised concerns about the accounting measure used by the notes. See Darrell Duffie, A 
Contractual Approach to Restructuring Financial Institutions in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 
AS WE KNOW THEM 109-124 (George Schulz, Kenneth Scott, & John Taylor eds., 2010). 
57 Press Release, Rabobank, Rabobank Successfully Issues Senior Contingent Notes (Dec. 3, 
2010), http://www.rabobank.com/content/news/news_archive/005-
RabobanksuccesfullyissuesSeniorContingentNotes.jsp (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). 
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unsecured bank debt; however, at a trigger of accounting bank 
equity/RWA (risk-weighted assets) ratio of 7%, the instruments are 
written down to 25% of their face value. Holders of the notes receive 
25% of the face value plus accrued interest. The senior notes are not 
recognized for regulatory purposes (in contrast to the Tier 1 stress test 
treatment of ECNs).  
In many ways the SCN diverges from the earlier proposed forms of 
CoCo; there are neither share issuances nor dilution of shareholder value, 
thus removing any upside from the note holders. Yet the purpose remains 
the same. Both forms of note remove debt obligations from bank ledgers, 
allowing continued operation in times of stress. 
 
V.    THE NEED FOR CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE CAPITAL 
 
The recent failing of venerable financial institutions opened the 
world’s eyes to various types of reform. Titans of the industry are now in 
the throes of bankruptcy proceedings, the pockets of taxpayers or the 
stages of recovery. Innumerable propositions for reform have circulated, 
and there is no clear, tidy solution. Amongst the pockets of proposals and 
resolutions, contingent convertible capital has emerged as a feasible 
component to efficient recapitalization in times of distress. 
The Federal Reserve, the Basel Committee of Bank Supervisors and 
leading bankers have all spoken in favor of adopting some form of 
CoCo.
58
 Switzerland became a primary nation to fully endorse the idea, 
proposing that the country’s biggest banks be mandated to hold capital 
equivalent to 19% of their risk-weighted assets, of which 9% can be in 
the form of CoCo.
59
 Though Switzerland’s increased capital reserves is a 
noble idea, it is also an expensive one for banks. In the United States, the 
need for higher reserves should be tempered through contingent 
convertible capital. 
CoCo provides benefits both in expansions and contractions of the 
economy. Implementing contingent convertible capital is an affordable 
solution in boon times. The excess premiums should be tax deductible, 
and the debt will serve investors and shareholders by diminishing the 
overall cost of capital in comparison to a pure Tier 1 equity standard. In 
strained times, well-structured triggers can allow for near seamless 
recapitalization. If companies hold ample reserves of CoCo, they can 
convert these reserves into Tier 1 equity to offset the losses and 
distresses on the system. 
Having reviewed many of the various formulations of CoCo, the 
instrument should rely on purely objective measures. There is no need 
for a uniform standard across banks or nations; the necessity is to 
                                                     
58 See generally Damien Paletta, Idea to Prevent Next Banking Bust, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 
2010, at A2. 
59 See Simon Nixon, Switzerland Goes Cuckoo for CoCo Bonds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2010, at 
C10. 
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minimize manipulations by outside actors and interested rent-seeking 
agents. This should not involve reliance on declarations of systemic 
crises, as the Squam Lake Group’s macro-proposal advocated. There is 
no need to risk the failure of systemically important institutions when 
recapitalization can slow liquidation or impede runs. The reason to raise 
contingent stockpiles is not to hold them until maturity in dire times. 
Doing so may cause the crash of important institutions, and the crash of 
any one institution can bring down the financial system through 
spreading contagion. 
A single trigger should sufficiently meet the needs of the instrument. 
Actors with the most knowledge of their institutions should determine 
the selection of this trigger. Whether the device is overall equity levels, 
market prices, Tier 1 capital ratios or some other measure, it is clear that 
accounting values will suffer too much lag to properly repel recession. 
Uninformed observers should not gauge the ideal amount of CoCo 
needed, but a level near the Tier 1 ratio would allow for ready 
recapitalization.  
Manipulation can be limited by weighing the price level for 
conversion over a series of days. While this creates the possibility of 
undue delay, a severe one day drop or flash crash should not beget errors 
of unnecessary conversion.
60
 Such weighing should increase the costs of 
manipulation, preventing value hunters from driving up (or down) price 
levels to pinpoint ideal conversion moments. 
To further abate manipulation, the troubled institution’s selection of 
which CoCo bonds to convert must limit the zeal of CoCo holders 
seeking to force conversion at favorable rates. Bonds nearest to maturity 
should not be the first converted. Frequent retranching may be a solution, 
as could tiering CoCo issues by proximity to selection. Offering higher 
coupon rates to the first to convert may limit their yield through 
conversion. There is no need to overly police the amount of CoCo on 
reserve, as more kept in store will only increase the buffer for hard times. 
CoCo should not generate death spirals through runs on the institutions 
to a higher degree than present runs. Even if manipulation is successful 
and the covenants are triggered, existing shareholders would lose by 
selling before the shares return to their proper pre-manipulation 
valuations.  
The COERC note would require refinement before implementation, 
but its appeal to shareholder action is a noble concern that should place 
management’s feet closer to the flame. Fixed quantities of shares upon 
conversion also may dampen the enthusiasm of CoCo investors, who 
would likely want to limit their loss to feasible levels in case of 
conversion at miniscule share prices. For these reasons, pricing the 
conversion at face value of the debt instrument appears most feasible. To 
                                                     
60 Although these errors could be remedied through repurchase of the new equity issue, subject 
to existing or modified regulation. 
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combat manipulation, tools such as McDonald’s conversion premium 
could be effective without causing severe diminution of CoCo par value. 
Excess stockpiles of CoCo will no doubt upset equity holders. They 
will be aware of the potential for share values to be diluted and will seek 
to prevent conversion in all but the most perilous times. Relying on the 
market may somewhat appease this scenario, but at some level 
shareholders will impact the process. From the view of outside taxpayers, 
it is prudent to punish the shareholders in bad times for their failure to 
monitor and oversee the managers of firms. Dilution thins share values 
but protects the nation at large by reducing or eliminating its bailout 
burden. Avoiding the need for rescue is the goal of any new regulation, 
and to have it come at the expense of shareholders is no cruel 
circumstance when compared to the moral hazard intrinsic in an influx of 
outside aid. 
Secured bondholders and depositors are unlikely to realize any new 
gains or losses from contingent arrangements. Their interests are 
protected in times of bankruptcy and will likewise be safe before and 
after conversion, with new equity available to meet regular interest 
obligations.  
Managers may be jeopardized by the potential for CoCo conversion, 
as new stockholders may voice their displeasure by replacing ineffective 
agents. If the triggering spurs dilution, a set of diverse interests can 
detract from the operations of an institution. The establishment of new 
stockholders will not immediately coincide with a swift replacement of 
incumbent management, who may begin to prepare their parachutes. To 
avoid efficiency losses, the new stockholders may best be served by 
giving current management the opportunity to remedy their precarious 
position. These interests will differ from firm to firm and scenario to 
scenario but cannot be eased with ex ante recommendations. 
It must be reemphasized that properly structured CoCo would, like 
many debt instruments, simply be held to maturity. Triggers will not be 
set at levels that prompt frequent and tumultuous conversions. The 
salvage mechanism behind the hybrid instruments is one saved for 
infrequent and notorious economic troubles. The device affords 
institutions time to remedy losses without resorting to the hesitant 
outside market and can eventually rectify mismanagement if new 
shareholders positively exert their influence. In standard non-
recessionary times, CoCo can also act as a barometer of the riskiness of 
TBTF firms, as their accompanying premiums will rise or fall in 
conjunction with the institutional hazards as assessed by the market. 
 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
 
There is no better time than the present to continue the emergence of 
CoCo in the market. The securities will not save every firm, as no 
amount of equity can shield certain crippling losses. Yet the risk of 
contagion can be decreased by recapitalizing viable institutions. 
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Regulators or banks may continue to find ways to limit manipulation. 
Attacking short selling by interested CoCo holders and preventing TBTF 
firms from holding their contemporaries’ CoCo could become effective 
policies in time. But as the Dodd-Frank Act proceeds towards new 
capital standards and the imposition of living wills, contingent 
convertible capital should be a functional engine to propel progress in the 
financial sector. 
